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The Treaty of New Echota,2 the most notorious of the nearly seventy treaties 
created to perfect Indian removal toward the end of the Andrew Jackson presidency (term 
of office: 1829-1837),3 serves as a totemic reminder of the fate of North American Natives 
and their engagement with international law. The legal rationalizations that justified 
removal ultimately forced between 100,000 to 125,000 southeastern Natives of the United 
States to relocate.4 Notwithstanding improprieties associated with the conclusion of the 
treaty itself (amplified by “whisky and other inducements”5), the treaty also serves as an 
indirect expression of the “enlarged philanthropy” and underlaying formalism that 
influenced the western civilizing mission (mission civilisatrice).6 This formalism reflected 
a Christian entitlement to land that European nations had asserted and applied among 
themselves in their colonial endeavors,7 and it entered American jurisprudence as part of 
this western inheritance. 
Within the United States historical context, this underlying rationale had less to do 
with Native sovereignty and self-determination and more to do with Antebellum struggles 
with federalism.8 Early American republicanism divided power among executive, judicial, 
and legislative branches. Calibrating the checks and balances among these newborn 
chambers and in relation to states’ rights created many early nineteenth century 
 
2 See Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Cherokee, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 [hereinafter Treaty of New 
Echota]. 
3 See The U.S. Foreign Policy on Indian Removal and Its Impact on Democracy, ESRI, 
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html?appid=7bf38b6b77b6412caf95e636ed9616af 
[https://perma.cc/PYD3-34BY] (last visited June 23, 2020) (noting almost 70 treaties). 
4 See Christina Snyder, How the Forced Removal of the Southeast’s Indians Turned Native Lands into 
Slave Plantations, ZÓCALO (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2018/01/02/forced-
removal-southeasts-indians-turned-native-lands-slave-plantations/ideas/essay/ [https://perma.cc/J2DA-
JYD9] (estimating 100,000); Trail of Tears, HIST.COM (July 7, 2020) , 
https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/trail-of-tears [https://perma.cc/GWT4-KSAX] 
(estimating nearly 125,000). 
5 JOHN P. BROWN, OLD FRONTIERS: THE STORY OF THE CHEROKEE INDIANS FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO THE 
DATE OF THEIR REMOVAL TO THE WEST, 1838, at 498 (1938). 
6 See Alfred Balch to Andrew Jackson, Jan. 8, 1830, LIB. CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/maj.01074_0281_0284/?sp=1&st=text [https://perma.cc/639B-H3VL] 
(noting that “[t]he removal of the Indians would be an act of seeming violence. But it will prove in the end 
an act of enlarged philanthropy.”). For a discussion of the emergence of the late 18th century idea of the 
civilizing mission as a broadly interpreted western counter to barbarism, see generally ILYA LAZAREV, THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT, PHILANTHROPY AND THE IDEA OF SOCIAL PROGRESS IN EARLY AUSTRALIA: CREATING A 
HAPPIER RACE? (2018). On its contorted philanthropic purpose in terms of French, British, and American 
imperialism, see Kodjo Afagla, Shattering the Civilizing Claims of Colonialism: George Lamming’s 
Natives of My Person, 3 REVUE DU CAMES, LITTÉRATURE, LANGUES ET LINGUISTIQUE 69 (2015). 
7 Edward Dumbauld, John Marshall and the Law of Nations, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 38, 54 (1955). 
8 See Guy C. Charlton, Aboriginal Rights and Constitutional Conflict: The Marshall Court, State and 
Federal Sovereignty, and Native American Rights under the 1789 Constitution, 8 AM. INDIAN L.J. 149, 150 
(2019) (citing Reginald Horsman). 
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jurisdictional and political uncertainties.9 Complicating this federal-state interface was the 
historically less considered constitutional reference to Indian tribes,10 which itself 
constituted a third sovereign sphere in the mindset of early American founders.11 However, 
the federal-state narrative dominated attention, and it produced seedlings of legal 
formalism that would attach “rights of soil” to the successors of metropolitan rule and not 
to the Native peoples who claimed the ancestral hunting grounds as homeland for 
millennia. 
What Enlightenment rationale oriented early Confederation Congress committee 
reports toward the conclusion that the “‘right of soil’ and territorial sovereignty belonged 
to the United States and that tribes could `remain only on her sufferance’[?]”12 Moreover, 
why did this simple presumption assign superior English rights to land in America? Rights 
acquired by conquest provide a partial answer, and was unquestionably part of the law of 
nations at this time.13 As the United States Supreme Court held in Harcourt v. Gaillard 
(1827), “[w]ar is a suit prosecuted by the sword; and where the question to be decided is 
one of original claim to territory, grants of soil made flagrante bello by the party that fails, 
can only derive validity from treaty stipulations.”14 However, this classical principle 
subordinated territorial claims to the exercise of effective control over the seized territory.15 
In fact, the conquest of the North American Indians did not result immediately with the 
founding of the Jamestown colony in 1607, nor was that the settlers’ initial intention.16 The 
resolution of the Indian question remained a contested issue for more than 200 years. 
Imputing the right of soil to colonists, as opposed to Natives, needed time to take 
shape. European descendants began to compartmentalize and minimize the moral 
dissonance associated with colonization that would achieve broader expression in the form 
of the fraudulent Treaty of New Echota, and broadest expression in the form of Manifest 
Destiny. Although popular history has tended to periodize and magnify the singular 
 
9 Note the high political stakes involved in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the power 
of judicial review by the Supreme Court); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (depriving states of 
the power to tax the federal government); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (holding a state law 
unconstitutional). 
10 The U.S. Constitution references Indian Tribes in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (excluding Indians not 
taxed); art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulating commerce with Indian tribes); and the U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 
(regarding apportionment, excluding Indians not taxed). 
11 See Kevin Washburn, Moving Forward on Native American Rights, UI CTR. HUM. RTS. (Aug. 5, 2020), 
https://uichr.uiowa.edu/programs/racial-equity-and-human-rights-series/moving-forward-on-native-
american-rights/ (30:52 time mark). 
12 Charlton, supra note 8, at 153. 
13 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 288-89 (1905) (noting that “subjugation as a 
mode of acquiring territory” was among the earliest of accepted principles governing the law of nations). 
14 Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 528 (1827). 
15 See Marcelo G. Kohen, Conquest, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW__ (2015). 
16 Jamestown, and all early North American settlements, were founded as entropôts, akin to the Kontors of 
the Hanseatic League and fondachi of Italian city states, to promote international trade on the Atlantic 
seaboard coastline, not as a springboard into the conquest of the North American interior. See James 
O’Mara, Town Founding in Seventeenth-Century North America: Jamestown in Virginia, 8 J. HIST. 
GEOGRAPHY 1 (1982) (discussing the initial purpose for the founding of the colony).  
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significance of Columbus’s landing in the West Indies in 1492, the appropriation of this 
land space necessitated legal justification.17 The right of soil became an important construct 
of the colonial mindset of entitlement, and its elements extended far beyond fifteenth 
century claims of title by discovery.18 The right of soil attached first to the question of 
sovereignty before it grew into a question attaching to the acquisition of citizenship.19 The 
sovereign implications of the right of soil would become particularly important in the early 
nineteenth century due to competitions over the North American interior, and it would also 
serve as a salve to anoint the fraudulent conveyance at New Echota, which importantly 
helped to rewrite the course of American expansionism.  
This article investigates the mindset that created a treaty mask that turned a blind 
eye to fraud. The dispossession of Native treaty guarantees depended on another treaty—
the Treaty of New Echota. This irony also depended on the blind eye turned toward the jus 
soli principle, or perhaps the reformulation or birthright citizenship to explain how the 
reformulated principle overlooked Native possessory interests. The settler notion of jus soli 
carried deep within it an exclusionary idea about how sovereignty was to be asserted. 
Jus soli is the Latin rule that assigns nationality to a person born to the soil. The 
factor connecting citizenship to nationhood is the geographical place where the person is 
born, not the citizenship status of the parents. The principle grew out of the early modern 
expression that based personal claims to land and inheritance on birthright connections to 
the sovereign domain. It appeared in common law as early as 1608 in Calvin’s Case, where 
the birthright citizenship principle was extended to the postnati.20 It was readily received 
into the infant American republic’s construction of jus gentium, which jurists conceived to 
be a species of universal law.21 In Calvin’s Case, the King’s Bench ruled that a Scotsman 
was not an alien, although alien born to England, and could claim testamentary benefits to 
land in England because he was born to British soil.22 Jus soli dominated the assignment 
of nationality throughout most of the Americas because it promoted immigration to a 
 
17 Most immediately, note the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which intended to calm the fast-rising dispute 
between Spain and Portugal over newly-discovered land. The agreed upon division line (following a 
meridian line 370 leagues west of the Cap Verde Islands) granted lands east of the line to Portugal and 
lands west of the line to Spain. On the status and treatment of Amerindians, and on Spanish rights to 
conquest, see FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIO DE INDIS (1531); BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS, BREVÍSIMA 
RELACIÓN DE LA DESTRUCCIÓN DE LAS INDIAS (José Miguel Martínez Torrejón ed. 2006) [1552]. 
18 See Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387, 388 
(2006) (influentially describing settler colonialism as an invasion to be construed in terms of structural 
developments, not epiphenomenal events). 
19 An 1822 Indian Commission report to the James Madison administration held that “[t]he right of soil, or 
the absolute property . . . belong[ed] to the Sovereign, or State under whose authority the discovery and 
settlement were made.” JEDIDIAH MORSE, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES 
ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 279 (1822) (comprising a narrative of a tour performed in the summer of 1820 under a 
commission from the President of the United States, for the purpose of ascertaining, for the use of the 
government, the actual state of the Indian tribes in our country). 
20 Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 ER 377, 394 (K.B.) (establishing in common law the jus soli (birthright 
citizenship) principle. 
21 See Dumbauld, supra note 7, at 38-39 (citing Chief Justice John Marshall’s belief). 
22 Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 ER 377at 377-78 (discussing the facts of the case).  
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continent bereft of labor and surfeit of land.23 Yet, the settler mindset circumvented jus 
soli’s application to persons most obviously defined by the principle—the Natives who 
were born to the soil of the Americas. The interesting presumption, as noted by United 
States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823) was that 
this principle did not actually apply to the Natives. He wrote, while the Europeans:  
 
respected the rights of the Natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate 
dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence 
of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession 
of the natives. These grants have been understood by all, to convey a title to 
the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.24 
 
Marshall referenced this expression of dominion at the outset of the case,25 noting 
the corporate creation under the seal of English King James I of a land conveyance to the 
first Colony of Virginia in 1609.26 This credential was his initial point of reference for the 
ensuing discussion about good title to lands. Historian Peter d’Errico noted Marshall’s 
fundamental assumption that the history of the Natives, apart from what may be read as a 
softening or maturation of his thinking in the later Worcester case,27 did not actually begin 
with the Natives or considerations of jus soli, but with the construction of monarchical 
sovereignty and the chain of title that linked from that point forward.28 
A second Latin principle, jus sanguinis, established the competing rule of law.29 It 
based a child’s nationality on the nationality of the parents through the bloodline 
relationship, not on the geographical place where the person is born. Jus sanguinis 
predominated throughout Europe due to the continent’s more restrictive immigration 
practices.30 It influenced early twentieth century European citizenship due to dogmatic 
definitions of race, ethnicity, and nationhood.31 However, the rise of liberalism and human 
 
23 See James Brown Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 58, 58-59 (1930). 
24 Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) [hereinafter Johnson v. 
M’Intosh]. 
25 Id. at 543. 
26 Scott, supra note 23, at 543-44. 
27 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
28 Peter d’Errico, John Marshall, Indian Lover?, 39 J. West (2000),  
https://www.umass.edu/legal/derrico/marshall_jow.html [https://perma.cc/66BQ-VD42]. 
29 See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP 
TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 18, 19 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer 
eds., 2001) (noting the commonly adopted classification schemes of jus soli and jus sanguinis). This binary 
contraposition is now antiquated and now admits to hybrid formulations. See generally Gerard-René de 
Groot & Olivier Vonk, Acquisition of Nationality by Birth on a Particular Territory or Establishment of 
Parentage: Global Trends Regarding Ius Sanguinis and Ius Soli, 65 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 319 (2018). 
30 See Weil, supra note 29, at 18 (noting jus sanguinis historically formed to protect and preserve national 
ethnic character). 
31 See Christian Joppke, Citizenship between De- and Re-Ethnicization, 44 ARCHIVES EUROPÉENNES DE 
SOCIOLOGIE, 429, 436 (2003). 
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rights after WWII broadened the understanding of jus sanguinis and changed European 
notions about membership in political community.32 
Although state practice in the Americas favored jus soli, jus sanguinis left an early 
and indelible impress on the Americas. The sixteenth century viceroyals, who ruled over 
the formative political divisions and audencias (regional capitals) of the New World, and 
their subordinates, the encomenderos, who lorded over the massive territories that would 
ultimately transform into the modern latifundia system, subdued the Native populations of 
Central and South America as peninsulares. They were the direct Spanish-born surrogates 
of the crown who based their claims to the New World on the status jus sanguinis provided. 
Their bloodline carried with it the pedigree, the permission, the capital, the charters, the 
subordinates, and the slaves to dominate the New World. 
Peninsulares also imported to the Americas a blood-based elitism that spread an 
enduring pigmentocracy across the hemisphere, producing hierarchically descending 
admixtures of creoles, mestizos, mulatos, and moriscos, bookended by blancos and 
indígenas.33 In an ethno-geographic sense, the ascriptive attribute of jus sanguinis and its 
association with European ethnicity and identity politics contrasted with and ultimately 
yielded to the functional attribute of jus soli, which stimulated immigration and abetted 
territorial acquisition and expansion.34 However, the separation of jus soli and jus sanguinis 
was not as neat as these heuristic categories suggest. Hybridized classes of pigmentocracy 
endured, only to be magnified by the early seventeenth century importation of African 
slaves.  
The jus soli principle powerfully but subtly affected the post-colonial entitlement 
to land in the New World. It impacted a trilogy of Cherokee cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court,35 each penned by Chief Justice Marshall. These cases meant to 
balance the rule of law while addressing the recognized abridgment and ultimate 
dispossession of Native ancestral territory and treaty rights, all of which were framed 
totemically by the fraudulent Treaty of New Echota. 
The first of these cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), provided the controlling 
principle that impacted Native sovereignty claims: the European discovery of America 
“gave exclusive title to those who made it,” and that such a priority of this discovery 
doctrine “necessarily diminished” the power of Indian nations “to dispose of the soil at 
 
32 See generally William Safran, Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to 
Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 313 (1997) 
(discussing ascriptive and functional constructions of nationality and changing notions of membership in 
political community). 
33 The Museo Nacional del Virreinato, in Tepotzotlán, Mexico houses an anonymous 18th century oil on 
canvas painting depicting stylized 16 racial groupings that represent the Sistema de castas colonial.  On the 
caste system generally and as mostly applied in India, see LOUIS DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHICUS: ESSAI 
SUR LE SYSTÈME DES CASTES (1966). 
34 See Weil, supra note 29.  
35 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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their own will, to whomsoever they pleased.”36 The case associated the discovery doctrine 
with the phrase “of the soil,” referencing this connection eight times in the judgment.37 
However, these telluric references attached as the intellectual and historical default position 
of benefit only to the colonists after their migratory arrival in the New World, and not to 
the indigenous inhabitants who had historically occupied these homelands. This ascription 
of migratory significance to colonists while denying “of the soil” rights to the Natives drew 
from a bedrock principle that would rationalize Native displacement, secure colonial 
entitlement, rework a principle imported from roman law, and apply it to the westerners 
who constructed it. It would serve as a jurisprudential talisman to assert Christian authority 
and secure an undisturbed chain of title linking royal authority to republican rule. It 
selectively wove political and historical concepts into “a garment fit for a king and yet free 
of any king’s claims,” producing “a legal theory suitable for a ‘democratic’ empire,”38 
dressed up in part by the Treaty of New Echota. To discuss this connection between the 
European Enlightenment value assigned to the discovery doctrine, and its relation to the 
principle of jus soli, it is first important to place into context the circumstances leading to 
the signing of the fraudulent treaty. 
 
II. THE BETRAYAL 
 
John Ross (1790-1866; Kooweskoowe) served as Principal Chief of the Cherokee 
Nation between 1828-1866.39 He was a creative, subtle and “skilled political operator,”40 
privately educated, half Scottish, and one-eighth Cherokee.41 Although unable to speak 
 
36 Johnson v. M’Intosh, at 574 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the global reach of the discovery 
doctrine, see generally Blake A. Watson, The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on Native 
Land Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 507 (2011). 
37 Johnson v. M’Intosh, at 545 (associating the phrase with owners and proprietors); 563 (proprietors who 
could not be “devested” of their rights); 570 (establishing one of the first principles of colonial law); 574 
(relating to rightful occupancy; connecting to the original fundamental principle of discovery); 575 
(relating to the exclusive right to acquire); 586 (allowing for reservations and stipulations); and 603 
(connecting to powers of government). 
38 d’Errico, supra note 28.  
39 Ross rose through the ranks of the fractious, clannish, and confederated structure of the Cherokee Nation. 
Following 1817 land cession deals that resulted in a geographic split of the Cherokee, along with the 
creation of the Cherokee Nation West (of the Mississippi River), Ross joined and eventually became leader 
of the consolidated National Council in 1828, and he assumed that position until his death in 1866. See 
Walter H. Conser, Jr., John Ross and the Cherokee Resistance Campaign, 1833–1838, 44 J.S. HIST. 191, 
193 (1978).   
40 STEVE INSKEEP, JACKSONLAND: PRESIDENT ANDREW JACKSON, CHEROKEE CHIEF JOHN ROSS, AND A 
GREAT AMERICAN LAND GRAB 7 (2016). 
41 Interethnic relations among Cherokees and white traders and backwoodsmen of the ante-Revolutionary 
period were common, and many of the “leading men” of the Cherokee had more white than Indian blood. 
Under the former laws of the Cherokee Nation, “anyone who could prove the smallest portion of Cherokee 
blood was rated as Cherokee, including many of one-sixteenth, one-thirty-second, or less of Indian blood.” 
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS NORTH OF MEXICO 913 (Frederick Webb Hodge, ed., 1907). For more, 




Cherokee fluently, he grew up among Cherokee children and Cherokee leaders such as 
Pathkiller (Nungnoheeahdahee) and Charles Renatus Hicks favored him.42 Ross’s fluency 
in English, his previous service as an Indian agent for the United States government, and 
his diplomatic ability to elide between cultures affirmed his standing as a major negotiating 
asset in the Cherokees’ bid to preserve tribal sovereignty in the face of encroaching United 
States interests. After Pathkiller and Hicks died within weeks of each other, Ross assumed 
a leadership position and one year later became Principal Chief.43 He guided the Nation 
through a period of factional politics, forced migration, internal Civil War, the United 
States Civil War (politically siding with the Confederacy), and reconstruction.44 
Of the many challenges in his career, history settles on one seminal event. On 
December 29, 1835, he and a delegation of Cherokees were in route to Washington, D.C. 
for negotiations on tribal sovereignty. Unknown to him, a group of twenty other Cherokees, 
led by Major John Ridge (Ca-nung-da-cla-geh, “the man who walks on the 
mountaintop”),45 his son John, and John’s cousin, the pro-assimilation Cherokee Phoenix 
newspaper editor Elias Boudinot (Gallegina Uwati),46 had brokered a deal with Indian 
Commissioners of the Jackson administration, General William Carroll and John 
 
(2003) (discussing acculturation and miscegenation among Native peoples in the North American 
southeast); and FAY A. YARBROUGH, RACE AND THE CHEROKEE NATION: SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY (2008) (discussing themes of interracialism and identity in Native American 
culture). 
42 See GARY E. MOULTON, JOHN ROSS, CHEROKEE CHIEF 33 (1978) (noting Hicks particularly as Ross’ 
mentor). 
43 See ROBERT J. CONLEY, A CHEROKEE ENCYCLOPEDIA 119 (2007) (following William Hicks’ short stint 
as Principal Chief). 
44 See generally MOULTEN, supra note 42. On the belabored decision to side with the Confederacy, see 
Gary E. Moulton, Chief John Ross During the Civil War, 19 CIVIL WAR HIST. 314, 318 (1973) (announcing 
at the Cherokee National Conference “the time has now come . . . to adopt preliminary steps for an alliance 
with the Confederate states.”). Two-thirds of Cherokee men fought for the Union, however after the Union 
troops abandoned nearby Fort Gibson, Ross (himself a plantation and slave owner) sided with the 
Confederacy. After the war, the Cherokee Nation signed its last treaty with the United States, the punitive 
Treaty of 1866. See History, CHEROKEE NATION, https://www.cherokee.org/about-the-nation/history/ 
[https://perma.cc/E9KH-6JF8]. 
45 See Brian Hicks, The Cherokees vs. Andrew Jackson, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 2011), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-cherokees-vs-andrew-jackson-277394/ 
[https://perma.cc/X5D7-7QZJ] (translating literally Ridge’s Cherokee naming into English). Ridge fought 
alongside western Tennessee forces of General Andrew Jackson against the British and Creek Red Sticks in 
the War of 1812. Jackson awarded him the rank of Major for the role he and his 500 Cherokees played in 
defeating the Creeks in the 1814 Battle of Horseshoe Bend, and for negotiating Creek Chief Lamochattee’s 
surrender to Jackson, which forced the cession of 25 million acres of Creek land (about one-half of present-
day Alabama and one-fifth of Georgia) to the United States. For his efforts and in consideration of his land 
holdings and business interests, Ridge earned the rank and title for which he thereafter became known. In 
the 1820s and 1830s he served as Speaker of the National Cherokee Council. See The Life of Major Ridge, 
CHIEFTAINS MUSEUM, https://chieftainsmuseum.org/2011/05/history-of-chieftains/ [https://perma.cc/B6B5-
GS3G]; See Indian Treaties and the Removal Act of 1830, ST. DEP’T. OFF. HIST., 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/indian-treaties [https://perma.cc/86BP-2R37].  
46 See generally RALPH HENRY GABRIEL, ELIAS BOUDINOT CHEROKEE & HIS AMERICA (1941); CHEROKEE 
EDITOR: THE WRITINGS OF ELIAS BOUDINOT (Theda Perdue ed., 1996). 
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Schermerhorn. The deal concluded the Treaty of New Echota, which was signed on that 
day. 
The unofficial Cherokee ‘Treaty Party’, comprised of not one member empowered 
to convene a National Council for such a treaty-making purpose,47 ceded ancestral land in 
the southeast to the United States in exchange for five million dollars, a promised 
Cherokee-appointed delegate to the United States House of Representatives,48 and new 
land 1,200 miles to the west; in and around present-day Tahlequah, Oklahoma. The treaty 
extended citizenship to heads of households desiring to remain49 in line with treaty 
provisions extended to the Cherokees in 1817 and 1819.50 However, Jackson later struck 
that provision.51 Jackson’s rejection underscored the fundamental disjunction in the 
American mindset, which did not view the Cherokees as “citizens to begin with even as 
sovereignty was claimed over them.”52 They were not of the soil or the bloodline in the 
same way the European presentations of jus soli or jus sanguinis claimed to be. A nebulous 
category had to be constructed for them—domestic dependents. This category, at best, 
made them quasi-sovereigns in need of tutelage and guardianship.53 This constructed 
category of diminished capacity helped to overlook the Treaty Party’s lack of credentials 
and standing to conclude the New Echota Treaty. Domestic dependency asserted an 
endemic quality of infancy to the character of Native Americans, which Europeans 
assumed required guardianship. Guardianship, done partly for the good of Natives, 
nevertheless required the contested means by which the settlers secured Native signatures. 
In Jackson v. Wood (1810), New York’s celebrated jurist and soon-to-be Chancellor 
of the Court of Chancery (1814-1823), James Kent, described the inapplicability of jus soli 
citizenship to Native Americans as follows:  
 
 
47 BROWN, supra note 5, at 499 (noting the right to call a National Council vested only in the Principal 
Chief or his delegate).  
48 Art. 7, Treaty of New Echota, supra note 2 (holding “[the Cherokee] shall be entitled to a delegate in the 
House of Representatives of the United States whenever Congress shall make provision for the same.”). For 
background, see Ezra Rosser, The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional 
Delegate, 15 PUB. INT. L.J., 91 (2005). In August 2019, the Oklahoma-based Cherokee Nation and its 
370,000 citizens (representing the largest of the three federally-recognized Cherokee tribes) announced its 
intention to appoint Kimberly Teehee to serve as the Cherokee delegate. The treaty is silent on the question 
of the delegate’s status as a voting or non-voting member of the House, should the measure take effect. See 
Harmeet Kaur, The Cherokee Nation Wants a Representative in Congress, Taking the US Government up 
on a Promise it Made Nearly 200 Years Ago, CNN (Aug. 25, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/25/politics/cherokee-nation-congressional-delegate-treaty/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/BN5H-5CUU].  
49 See art. 12, Treaty of New Echota, supra note 2 (provided they reside in North Carolina, Tennessee, or 
Alabama). 
50 KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AMERICA, 1600-
2000, at 60–61 (2015).  
51 See BROWN, supra note 5, at 498 (including a promise of 160 acres of land, as well). 
52 PARKER, supra note 50, at 61.  
53 Marshall “more correctly” denominated them as “domestic dependent nations.” Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.), at 17.  
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Their political relation to this state is peculiar, and sui generis. If they are 
not aliens in every sense, because of their dependence as a tribe, and their 
right to protection, they cannot be considered as subjects born under 
allegiance, and bound, in the common law sense of the term, to all its 
duties.54  
 
This nuanced interpretation of jus soli connected the right of soil to the embedded European 
understanding of fealty. This fealty attached to a sovereign authority framed according to 
the features of European history, identity, political structure, and geo-space (specifically 
land cultivation). The Scotsman in Calvin’s Case, although alien to England, shared a 
common allegiance to the crown, thus entitling him to the same rights of ownership as had 
belonged to the English. An unusual circumstance necessitated this extension of allegiance: 
When Elizabeth I died without issue in 1603, the Tudor dynasty came to an end, passing 
the crown to her cousin—the Scottish Stuart, King James VI.55 He unified Scotland, 
England, and Ireland and ruled as James I, necessitating a reconsideration of common law 
inheritance structure. The conveyance in Calvin’s Case established the jus soli principle: 
“all persons born within any territory held by the King of England were to enjoy the 
benefits of English law as subjects of the King.”56  
Jus soli, once imported to the United States, carried with it a pre-existing fealty 
condition that Natives simply could not possess, despite some later attempts at 
assimilation.57 Abstractly, this element of jus soli bore some resemblance to the Spanish 
Requerimiento (1513), which divinely ordained a right to possess the territories of the New 
World based on theological qualities internal to Christendom, which were unknown and 
unavailable to “savages.”58   
 
III. THE RESPONSE 
 
The complete southeastern cession of Cherokee Nationhood to the federal 
government created paroxysms within the tribe. Ross denounced the instrument as a 
 
54 Jackson v. Wood, 7 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (emphasis added). 
55 See generally Christian Schneider, A Kingdom for a Catholic? Pope Clement VIII, King James VI/I, and 
the English Succession in International Diplomacy (1592-1605), 37 INT’L HIST. REV. 119-41 (2014) 
(detailing the succession politics involving the death of the Virgin Queen, Elizabeth I, the last of the six 
monarchs of the House of Tudor). 
56 Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
73, 73–74 (1997). 
57 See generally FREDERICK HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-
1920 (1984). 
58 See generally Marcelo Gabriel Zorrilla, El Acta de Requerimiento y la Guerra Justa, 885 REVISTA DEL 
NOTARIADO 247 (2006); Lewis Hanke, The “Requerimiento” and Its Interpreters, 1 REVISTA DE HISTORIA 
DE AMÉRICA 25 (1938). See also Pope Nicholas V’s DUM DIVERSAS (1452) and Pope Callixtus III’s INTER 
CATERA (not to be confused with pope Alexander VI’s INTER CATERA of 1493), which granted Portugal 
territorial rights of discovery along the West Coast of Africa. 
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“pretended treaty,” “deceptive to the world and a fraud upon the Cherokee people.”59 A 
petition denouncing the treaty collected 15,964 Cherokee signatures, which represented a 
huge majority of the tribal population.60 Ross formally protested to the United States 
Congress, describing the treaty as a denationalization and disenfranchisement “effected by 
the . . . venerated . . . sacred appellation of treaty.”61 
Ridge, however, viewed the treaty as a rational, political attempt to preserve 
dwindling tribal sovereignty and cultural cohesiveness in the face of overwhelming odds. 
Jackson had made this point explicitly clear in an 1835 circular addressed to the Cherokees: 
“[Y]ou cannot remain where you are now. . . . You have but one remedy within your reach. 
And that is, to remove to the West.”62 Ridge’s few defenders construed Jackson’s message 
as the one-and-only option—a Hobson’s Choice.63 Jackson’s friend and Commissioner of 
Indian Treaties, Alfred Balch,64 viewed removal as a charitable expression of stewardship. 
He wrote to Jackson that “[r]emoval of the Indians would be an act of seeming violence;”65 
it would prove to be in their interest as “[t]hese untutored sons of the Forest, cannot exist 
in a state of Independence, in the vicinity of the white man. If they will persist in remaining 
where they are, they may begin to dig their graves and prepare to die.”66 Historian Peter 
Onuf argued that the “ideological rationale for an expansive republican empire” depended 
on a self-serving logic establishing Indian removal as an expression of guardianship.67  
 
59 Letter from John Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation of Indians: In Answer to Inquiries from a 
Friend Regarding the Cherokee Affairs with the United States, Followed by a Copy of the Protest of the 
Cherokee Delegation, Laid Before the Senate and House of Representatives at the City of Washington, on 
the Twenty-first Day of June, Eighteen Hundred and Thirty-six, DIGITAL LIBR. GEORGIA, 
https://dlg.usg.edu/record/dlg_zlna_pam017#text [https://perma.cc/DZL5-YLK2]. 
60 BROWN, supra note 5, at 499 (of an estimated population of 17,000). There is some dispute about the 
number of dissenting Cherokees. An 1835 census indicated that there were 16,743 Cherokees residents, not 
counting their slaves. Three thousand Cherokees had already enrolled to remove, and it appears the 
signatures of Cherokee women and children were counted among the petitioners denouncing the treaty. See 
Kenneth Penn Davis, The Cherokee Removal, 1835-1838, 32 TENN. HIST. SOC’Y 311, 316 (1973).  
61 LETTER FROM CHIEF JOHN ROSS TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RED CLAY COUNCIL 
GROUND, CHEROKEE NATION (Sept. 28, 1836). 
62 Andrew Jackson, To the Cherokee Tribe East of the Mississippi, Mar. 16, 1835, GILDER LEHRMAN INST., 
https://ap.gilderlehrman.org/resource/andrew-jackson-cherokee-tribe-1835 [https://perma.cc/KY8V-CF4Z]. 
63 Hobson’s Choice, MERIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Hobson%27s%20choice [https://perma.cc/V726-YFHT] (defining the phrase as 
“an apparently free choice when there is no real alternative”). Ridge made this decision at great personal 
cost given his extensive land, ferry, and business holdings in the land he had to give up. 
64 Balch owned the plantation next to Jackson’s plantation in Tennessee, from which their close friendship 
began. See Alfred Balch—Friend of Andrew Jackson, BALCHIPEDIA (Dec. 31, 2017), 
http://balchipedia.wikidot.com/alfredbalch1#:~:text=Alfred%20Balch(September%2017%2C%201785,Le
wis%20then%20eventually%20Anna%20Newman [https://perma.cc/UYQ6-87G6]. 
65  Letter from Alfred Balch to Andrew Jackson, January 8, 1830, LIBR. CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/maj.01074_0281_0284/?sp=1&st=text [https://perma.cc/X8L7-6MDX] (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2020). 
66 Id.  
67 Peter S. Onuf, “We Shall All Be Americans”: Thomas Jefferson and the Indians, 95 INDIANA MAG. HIST. 
103, 136 (1999). Historian Glenn Tucker traced this rationalization to Jefferson dexterous belief that 
depriving Natives of their land would help them to better lives. See GLENN TUCKER, TECUMSEH: VISION OF 
GLORY 136–40 (1973). 
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Ridge probably accepted Balch’s fatal conclusion, and the decision to remove came 
at considerable personal expense given the sizeable business holdings he had to give up.68 
History debates the suggestion that Ridge had no option but to sign the treaty. However, 
Ross’ subsequent efforts to void the treaty also failed, suggesting that a violent fate awaited 
the Cherokees in their encounter with United States regardless of the diplomatic pathway 
taken to stay or go.69 
Ridge also claimed that he signed his own death warrant by committing his name 
to the treaty.70 His prediction came true, and not for him alone. On June 22, 1839, Ridge, 
his son, and nephew were killed in closely connected attacks following a purported and 
discreet tribal verdict of treason.71 
 
IV. THE BETRAYAL IN BROADER CONTEXT 
 
Considered fraudulent even among supporters of Jackson’s administration,72 the 
United States Senate nevertheless ratified the treaty on May 23, 1836 by one vote.73 
Prominent white opposition included important names;74 adding to the general resistance 
movement arising in protest of the poor treatment of Natives that had spread among 
 
68 Ridge’s decision to sign the treaty came with direct, personal costs to his land holdings and established 
business interests in Georgia. He had been the third wealthiest Cherokee at that time, operating a 200-acre 
plantation with 15-30 Black and Native slaves, a trading post, and a ferry across the Oostanoulah River. See 
Cherokee Leader Major Ridge and the Indian Removal Act, GPB EDUC, YOUTUBE, at 2:00 
 (Sept. 12, 2019) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHkWHlmekPY. 
69 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story (1779-1845), considered one of the four most important justices of 
the nineteenth century, foretold of a similar fate for the Cherokee. In route to the 1832 opening session of 
the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C., Story encountered two Cherokee Chiefs in Philadelphia. Fully 
aware of the forces working against their Nation, and although impressed with knowledge of the law and 
advocacy skills, he wrote to his wife: “I never in my whole life was more affected by the consideration that 
they and all their race are destined to destruction.”. . . “I feel, as an American, disgraced by our gross 
violation of the public faith towards them . . . [and] in the course of Providence there will be dealt to us a 
heavy retributive justice.” LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 741 (1974) (quoting Story’s 
1832 letter to his wife). For a debate about the motivations behind the removal campaign, as construed as 
an act to avoid or promote annihilation, see generally 2 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE 
COURSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 1822-1832 (1998) (supporting the thesis from Jackson’s leading 
biographer that Jackson sought to avoid the decimation of the tribe through removal), and ANTHONY F. C. 
WALLACE, THE LONG, BITTER TRAIL: ANDREW JACKSON AND THE INDIANS 5 (1993) (calling Jackson “the 
political prime mover of the Indian-removal process,” and supporting the thesis that Jackson pursued a 
policy of coercion). 
70 JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 295 (1988). 
71 See Will Chavez, Cherokee Historic Profile: The Murder of Elias Boudinot, CHEROKEE PHOENIX (Apr. 
30, 2012), https://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/index/6214 [https://perma.cc/MZT5-VFXK] 
(discussing the retribution); See also The Life of Major Ridge, CHIEFTAINS MUSEUM, 
https://chieftainsmuseum.org/2011/05/history-of-chieftains/ [https://perma.cc/6QLH-6QZ8]. 
72 Carl J. Vipperman, The Bungled Treaty of New Echota: The Failure of Cherokee Removal, 1836-1838, 
73 GA. HIST. Q. 540, 540 (1989). 
73 See Matthew L. Sundquist, Worcester v. Georgia: A Breakdown in the Separation of Powers, 35 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 239, 247 (2010). 
74 See Ovid Andrew McMillion, Cherokee Indian Removal: The Treaty of New Echota and General 
Winfield Scott 30 (Aug. 2013) (M.A. thesis, East Tennessee State University) (including Daniel Webster, 




progressive communities and churches of the Northeast.75 Anticipating violence in the four 
states overlapping with the Cherokee Nation, Jackson mustered 10,000 troops from 
Tennessee, North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia to keep the peace.76 The ratification set 
a two-year deadline for the Cherokees’ exodus. On May 17, 1838, Jackson’s successor, 
President Martin Van Buren (1782-1862) issued the order to Major General Winfield Scott: 
“cause the Cherokee Indians yet remaining in North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and 
Alabama to remove to the West.”77 This directive commenced the “most notorious tragedy 
of forced removal” that became known as the Trail of Tears (Nunahi-duna-dlo-hilu-I).78  
The forced march resulted in the death of one-quarter of the Cherokee people.79 It 
represented a stunning dénouement—the complete dispossession of 26 million acres of 
ancestral land in Georgia alone, all taken within the first 40 years of the nineteenth 
century.80 More than a historical act of betrayal, Cherokees commonly regard the treaty as 
the cause of implacable problems that continue to beset the Nation.81 
Many reasons contributed to the taking of the Cherokees’ ancestral hunting 
grounds. Land speculation, Manifest Destiny, railroad barons intent on penetrating the 
interior with roads and access lines, all combined as factors to put pressure on Cherokee 
tribal holdings. Additional causes included the influx of frontier settlers, the 1828 election 
of removal-minded President Jackson, the 1828 discovery of gold in Cherokee Territory 
(in Dahlonega, northwestern Georgia), and the 1830 Indian Removal Act.82 By 1832, the 
political and personal safety situation in Georgia had deteriorated to such an extent that the 
Cherokees moved their capital from New Echota to Red Clay, Tennessee. The relocation, 
 
75 See generally JEREMIAH EVARTS, CHEROKEE REMOVAL: THE “WILLIAM PENN” ESSAYS AND OTHER 
WRITINGs (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1982) (reprinting the popular 24 essays written with Christian 
conviction of the immorality of Andrew Jackson’s Indian removal policy); CLAUDIO SAUNT, UNWORTHY 
REPUBLIC: THE DISPOSSESSION OF NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE ROAD TO INDIAN TERRITORY (2020) 
(noting the fraudulent claims of white Northeasterners). 
76 R. G. DUNLAP TO EAST TENNESSEE VOLUNTEERS, SEPT. 14, 1836, IN REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF 
WAR, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 120, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 1837–38, 41. 
77 Major General Winfield Scott’s Orders No. 25 Regarding the Removal of Cherokee Indians to the West, 
May 17, 1838, DOCSTEACH, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/scott-
order-25 [https://perma.cc/MCW9-WSW3] (authorizing the forced removal of the Cherokee) (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2020). 
78 Vipperman, supra note 72, at 540. 
79 Indian Removal 1814-1858, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2959.html 
[https://perma.cc/8H7D-TCAU] (noting that four thousand of the sixteen thousand Cherokees forcibly 
removed “died of cold, hunger, and disease on their way to the western lands.”). 
80 BAKER, supra note 69, at 733. Moreover, the Cherokees had already surrendered half of their ancestral 
land by the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783. See Tim Alan Garrison, Cherokee Removal, NEW GA. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (July 23, 2018), https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-
archaeology/cherokee-removal [https://perma.cc/8DTB-R6WE].  
81 Shereen Marisol Meraji, A Treacherous Choice and a Treaty Right, NPR (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/824647676 [https://perma.cc/BSJ4-CQJ8] (recording the statement of 
Principal Chief of Cherokee Nation Chuck Hoskin, Jr.). 
82 Indian Removal Act of 1830, Pub. L. 21-148, 4 Stat. 411 (mandating that all Native Americans east of 
the Mississippi River relocate to land west of the Mississippi). 
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however, only delayed their forced removal by six years.83 More tragedy would follow the 
diaspora. “Old Settlers”—Natives who had voluntarily removed to the West in 1805 and 
1806 to preserve traditional ways—violently clashed with Ross’s later arriving 
assimilationists over governance of the Oklahoma Territory, a clash that further and 
perhaps irrevocably splintered the Nation.84  
Indications of this diaspora stretched back for decades. However, the unsettled 
political status of the interior beyond the Appalachians occupied more immediate attention 
than resolution of the Indian question. This status involved competing French, British, 
Spanish, and encroaching American interests. It first had to play out through the conclusion 
of the French and Indian War (1756-1763); the promulgation of the Confederated 
Congress’ Northwest Ordinance (1787), which outlined the process for admitting new 
states northwest of the Ohio River;85 the Louisiana Purchase (1803);86 and the War of 1812, 
which was fought in part over competing British, Native, and American claims to the 
interior. 
Equally unresolved throughout this period was the deeply conflicted early 
Republican mindset toward Indian diplomacy. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) often wrote 
with great admiration of Natives,87 and of the melancholy sequel of their history.88 
However, Jefferson’s idea of Indian removal: 
  
had its origins in the long-held view that the migration of eastern Indian 
tribes across the Mississippi River would be good for both whites and Native 
Americans. It would provide economic opportunity for the former and give 
the latter time and space in which to develop their potential for what the 
Anglo-European mindset thought of as civilization.89  
 
 
83 See Red Clay-James F. Corn Interpretive Facility, http://wsharing.com/WSphotosRedClay2.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KD6Q-7WQU] (presenting slides, images, and artifacts of Cherokee Red Clay).  
84 See Mary Young, The Cherokee Nation: Mirror of the Republic, 33 AM. Q. 502 (1981) [hereinafter The 
Cherokee Nation]. See generally JOHN SEDGWICK, BLOOD MOON: AN AMERICAN EPIC OF WAR AND 
SPLENDOR IN THE CHEROKEE NATION (2018) (detailing internecine problems involving removal and 
nationhood among Cherokee). 
85 See Document for July 13th: “An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States 
North-West of the River Ohio,” NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-
doc/index.html [https://perma.cc/9ZJR-BDE2] (ordinance adopted on July 13, 1787); See generally PETER 
S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (2019). 
86 A Convention Between the United States of America and the French Republic (Louisiana Purchase), Fr.-
U.S., Apr. 20, 1803, General Records of the U.S. Government; Record Group 46, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/louisiana-statehood/louisiana-purchase.html 
[https://perma.cc/NW72-WYA5].  
87 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, June 11, 1812, FOUNDERS ONLINE, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-05-02-0100 [https://perma.cc/X3X4-SXQC] 
(expressing “awe & veneration” for Cherokee warrior and orator Outassete). 
88 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Query XI, Aborigines (1785), reprinted in 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~Hyper/JEFFERSON/ch11.html [https://perma.cc/7L3G-EACR]. 
89 See generally S. Charles Bolton, Jeffersonian Indian Removal and the Emergence of Arkansas Territory, 
62 ARK. HIST. Q. 253 (2003). 
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Crucial to a general early republican understanding of civilization was the idea that settlers 
should exercise dominium over the land by converting it from its natural state into 
individually farmed plots of land.90 This conception differed from the mere occupancy and 
transient hunting and fishing practices that conformed to European conceptions of Native 
uses of vast communal acreage. Jefferson’s idea of introducing Natives to the “practice of 
husbandry and of the household arts” was not only meant to avert the precarious economics 
of subsistence, but it also intended to create a material association that more tightly bound 
the natural world to the reasoned world of human interconnection.91 Jefferson “argued that 
Indian peoples could only benefit by submitting to the discipline of the market, paying their 
debts to merchant creditors, and exchanging portions of their vast land reserves for the 
capital needed to make farms.”92 
Jefferson seemed to prefer a policy of cooptation or gradual circumscription, 
whereby Natives would “pare . . . off”93 and eventually integrate with the white society.94 
They would take on debt (which would force them to sell off land), engage with trading 
houses, adopt agrarian lifestyles, and possibly “in time . . . incorporate with us as 
citizens.”95 
 Thomas Paine (1737-1809) expressed this cooptation in progressive, directional 
terms. He emphasized the evolutionary movement from a natural state to a civilized state 
as a process of land cultivation: “for though every man, as an inhabitant of the earth, is a 
joint proprietor of it in its natural state, it does not follow that he is a joint proprietor of 
cultivated earth.”96 In words foreshadowing Marshall’s discovery doctrine and the 
assignment of dominium to those who “made it,” Paine wrote that “the additional value 
made by cultivation . . . became the property of those who did it[.]”97 As Natives did not 
make the Earth, their natural right to occupancy could not stand in the way of those who 
added value to soil through cultivation, which Paine described as one of the supreme human 
inventions.98 Jus soli thereby contained a subtle but essential qualitative component, a 
component based on improving, clearing, and parceling of the land. Cultivation not only 
added value and utility to the land, it generated taxable revenue for the sovereign. It 
incentivized the right of inheritance, strengthened fealty to the political order, and 
 
90 Id. 
91 Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1801, AVALON PROJECT, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jeffmes1.asp [https://perma.cc/HK6Z-2R8J]. 
92 Peter S. Onuf, “We Shall All Be Americans”: Thomas Jefferson and the Indians, 95 IND. MAG. HIST. 
103, 136 (1999). 
93 From Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, Feb. 27, 1803, FOUNDERS ONLINE, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-39-02-0500 [https://perma.cc/79MZ-
YLM4] [hereinafter Jefferson, Letter to William Henry Harrison]. 
94 Christian B. Keller, Philanthropy Betrayed: Thomas Jefferson, the Louisiana Purchase, and the Origins 
of Federal Indian Policy Removal, 144 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 39, 41 (2000). 
95 Jefferson, Letter to William Henry Harrison, supra note 93. 
96 THOMAS PAINE, AGRARIAN JUSTICE 9 (1999) [1797], http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Paine1795.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A3BW-MRPY]. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
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promoted the vested interests of nationhood. Labor directed toward land cultivation marked 
a key feature of progressivism in the early republican mindset, and it served as the emerging 
Lockean basis for private property,99 as well as liberalism, in North America.100 
Jefferson did not believe Native peoples could obstruct the pull of human history 
from the natural to the civilized state. He labeled any such resistance “foolhardy.”101 
Embedded in this logic was a view that Natives were misguided in their “sanctimonious 
reverence” for ancestral customs, which treated reason as a “false guide,” and self-
improvement as a “perilous innovation.”102 According to Jefferson, ancestral thinking 
marked the dominance of the Natives’ anti-Enlightenment view of progressivism. “[T]hey, 
too, have their anti-philosophers, who find an interest in keeping things in their present 
state.”103 Notwithstanding this view, Jefferson maintained a textured appreciation for the 
plight of the Native people in view of the wrongs that had been committed against them. 
He harbored an idea of recovering Native esteem from this process of cooptation, and yet 
he could not escape from hauntings of “justice and fear” for “the injustices we have done 
them.”104 
 
V. LAND GRANTS, THE OHIO VALLEY, AND MORE FRAUD 
 
The turbulent status of the interior, reflected at the outset by the three Powhatan 
Wars between the Algonquin alliance and the first English colonists at coastal 
Jamestown,105 belied the philosophical underpinnings of the discovery doctrine as a source 
of sovereignty as much as the discovery doctrine abridged the political status of Natives as 
 
99 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19–22; see generally ch. V (1986) [1690] (noting 
that the “wild Indian, who knows no enclosure” shares Nature as a “tenant in common”; adding that human 
labor takes “out of the hands of nature, where it was common,” and “enclose[es] it from the common”). 
100 See Duncan Ivison, Locke, liberalism and empire 86, 92 in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN LOCKE: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES (Peter R. Anstey ed., 2003) (noting the view that Amerindians did not live in properly civil 
societies because they did not cultivate the land beyond what they could use and lost out on what 
commercial development could bring to market economies and commercial systems). 
101 Jefferson, Letter to William Henry Harrison, supra note 93. 
102 Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), AVALON PROJECT, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau2.asp [https://perma.cc/GJ46-QVSB]. 
103 Id.   
104 From Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Hawkins, 13 August 1786, FOUNDERS ONLINE, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0159 [https://perma.cc/V7JH-VQRE] (“The 
two principles on which our conduct towards the Indians should be founded are justice and fear. After the 
injuries we have done them, they cannot love us, which leaves us no alternative but that of fear to keep 
them from attacking us.”). 
105 See J. Frederick Fausz, An “Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides”: England’s First Indian War, 
1609-1614, 98 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIO. 3 (1990) (discussing the first Anglo-Powhatan War, 1609-1614). 
The second Powhatan War lasted from 1622-1632, and the Third Powhatan War from 1644-1646. For more 
the Powhatan Wars and the Algonquin alliance leaders, Powhatan (Wahunsenacawh) and his brother 
Opechancanough, see generally Kevin E. Grimm, The Tidewater Wars, 1609-1946, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO 1877 (2014). 
418 
 
a resistance force. Contrary to the Enlightenment notion, the European discovery of 
America did not immediately yield uncontested title “to those who made it.”106 
Moreover, in 1763, a general design to monetize the North American interior 
intensified. Britain’s King George III attempted by Royal Proclamation to prevent land-
hungry colonists from jumping over the Appalachian Mountains and settling into the 
backwoods expanse of the Ohio Valley.107 This “claim-jumping” threatened to interfere 
with the revenue-generating private enterprises established through previous land grant 
charters from the king.108 The Proclamation attracted the support of the Shawnee Nation, 
which later aligned with the British during the Revolutionary War to staunch 
encroachments into Shawnee Territory caused by the overlapping and westward-stretching 
colonial claims of Virginia and Kentucky.109 The alliance ultimately proved catastrophic 
for the Shawnees, who unknowingly had all of their land ceded to the United States by 
their British ally with the signing of the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which ended the 
Revolutionary War.110 This lesson proved instrumental in forging Tecumseh’s (Tekoomsē) 
confederated Native resistance movement during the War of 1812, in view of divergent 
long-term political interests with the British and the superior military strength of the United 
States.111 
Land hunger and frontier expansion pressured Native populations and also created 
territorial competitions and parity concerns among newborn American states. To quell 
these emerging state competitions over control of the interior, states began ceding trans-
Appalachian land originally chartered to colonies back to the crown’s successor, the United 
States. Those transfers intended to end westward land competitions among the original 
colonies over territorial claims that both “state and national governments lacked the 
military power to enforce.”112 
 
106 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
107 See Royal Proclamation, 1763, INDIGENOUS FOUND., 
https://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/royal_proclamation_1763/ [https://perma.cc/57QK-QDEW]. 
108 See generally C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories and the 
States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1949) (discussing the fundamental connection between rights to 
the soil as the chief basis of American colonization and charter issuance from the king).  
109 See Colin G. Calloway, “We Have Always Been the Frontier”: The American Revolution in Shawnee 
Country, 16 AM. INDIAN Q. 39, 47 (1992) (noting the influx of 80,000 non-Natives into Shawnee country 
between 1775-1790). 
110 See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-
treaties/bevans/b-gb-ust000012-0008.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6MR-UKGJ]. 
111 The Shawnee confederated Native tribes under Tecumseh’s leadership to protect ancestral land during 
the War of 1812, bringing the union into an uneasy alliance with the British. His forces suffered a 
debilitating defeat in the Battle of Tippicanoe and he died in the Battle of Thames, which functionally 
destroyed coordinated Native resistance to western white advancement into the Ohio Valley. More has been 
written about Tecumseh than any other Native North American. For a leading biography, see generally 
JOHN SUGDEN, TECUMSEH: A LIFE (1997). 
112 Charlton, supra note 8, at 153. 
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Virginia began the charter cession process to the Continental Congress in 1784.113 
Georgia perfected its transfer with the 1802 Georgia Compact, ceding Yazoo country (now 
comprising Mississippi and Alabama) to the United States.114 In exchange, Georgia secured 
a promise that the United States would use its constitutional treaty-making power to 
negotiate the removal of remaining Native populations from Georgia “as rapidly as 
possible.”115 When that effort stalled (over an extended 36-year period), Georgia took 
matters into its own hands. 
Removal could not happen fast enough for Georgians. As early as 1795, almost 
every member of the Georgia legislature had conspired to sell land along the Yazoo River, 
which debouches into the Mississippi River.116 This region comprised thirty-five million 
acres of undeveloped land populated as Indian Reserve.117 The Georgia legislators set up a 
scheme to purchase land from the state for cotton production as hidden investors in land 
companies.118 The companies secured the land at prices well below market value and then 
resold the titles at vastly inflated prices, creating a nationwide Gordian entanglement of 
good and bad faith purchasers and resellers once the scheme unraveled.119 The profiteering 
ignored Native interests even more than the political problem of dealing with Spain’s vice-
grip over the port of New Orleans, through which exports of projected Yazoo cotton 
commerce would need to pass.120 The graft scandalized the Georgia legislature and all 




113 See generally Peter Onuf, Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands, 34 WM. & 
MARY Q. 353 (1977). 
114 David A. Nichols, Land, Republicanism, and Indians: Power and Policy in Early National Georgia, 
1780-1825, 85 GA. HIST. Q. 199, 199 (2001); Mary Young, The Exercise of Sovereignty in Cherokee 
Georgia, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 43, 45 (1990) [hereinafter Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia]. 
115 Nichols, supra note 114, at 199. 
116 Nichols, supra note 114. For a detailed description of the Yazoo Delta Region leading to its confluence 
at the Mississippi River, see generally FRANK E. SMITH, THE YAZOO RIVER (1988). 
117 See id. at 208. 
118 Id. at 200 (describing the Georgia legislature’s conduct as motivated by the cotton boom and partisan 
state level politics). 
119 The sale of the thirty-five million acres to the four land companies for $500,000 ended up in the pockets 
of legislators, state officials, newspaper editors, and other influential Georgians. See George R. Lamplugh, 
Yazoo Land Fraud, NEW GEORGIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-
archaeology/yazoo-land-fraud [https://perma.cc/G39G-HKZN]. Good faith speculators who had acquired 
land from the Yazoo companies “pressed Congress for payment, but for more than a decade, congressmen 
sympathetic to Georgia rebuffed them.” Id.  
120 See CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, THE YAZOO LAND COMPANIES 5-6 (1891) (noting “[t]value of western 
[Yazoo] lands for commercial and agricultural purposes depended almost entirely on the navigation of the 
Mississippi, over which Spain exercised sole control.”). 
121 News of the scandal produced some of the “wildest scenes ever witnessed in Georgia.” Legislators 
involved in the scandal “fled to other states or concealed themselves in their own counties.” One who fled 
“was followed and murdered in South Carolina.” William Estill Heath, The Yazoo Land Fraud, 16 Ga, Hist. 
Q. 274, 281 (1932). 
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VI. THE FEDERAL BLIND EYE 
 
A new Georgia legislature rescinded the Yazoo Land Fraud legislation in 1796.122 
However, in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), the Supreme Court invalidated the reform-minded 
Georgia legislature’s action.123 The Court let stand the fraudulent conveyances on grounds 
of the United States Constitution’s Contract Clause.124 The Court reasoned that a binding 
agreement under the Contact Clause could not be invalidated even if illegally secured.125 
Although seemingly at odds with public policy, the strengthening federal view intended to 
tamp down rampant beggar-thy-(out-of-state)-neighbor practices. The Court aimed to 
uphold a national policy supportive of private transactional rights that states had been less 
interested in honoring as among themselves.126  
The holding served as a barometer of the unsettled relationship between federal and 
state authority, which ultimately let stand the huge land fraud in order to preserve the 
rational power of compact and private property “from the effects of those sudden and 
strong passions to which men are exposed.”127 The strong passions of the case had been 
stoked by states’ rights supporters, who essentially attempted to assert their jus soli 
interests as derived from the 1802 Georgia Compact. The inability of the federal 
government to uphold in timely fashion its part of the Compact—the removal of the Creeks 
and Cherokees from a land space identified by the promoters of cotton culture—while at 
the same time weakening a state’s authority over its own territory by invalidating a state 
law, necessitated Georgia’s defense of the jus soli principle that would lead to the Treaty 
of New Echota and the Trail of Tears. This case provided a foretelling glimpse at the 
coming formalistic gloss that would honor the terms of the New Echota Treaty despite 
overwhelming evidence of fraudulent dispossession. The right of soil attaching to federal 
treaty-making power overrode the political practice that impeded the good faith 
performance of compacts (pacta sunt servanda).   
 
VII. CHEROKEES REFUSE TO MOVE 
 
The Yazoo Land Fraud did nothing to abate other self-help efforts by Georgians to 
secure Indian removal. According to historian Julie Reed, the political turmoil in Cherokee 
Territory turned into an unrelenting “lawlessness . . . on the ground.”128 Georgia land 
sharks, claim jumpers, and squatters had already begun promoting the distribution of 
 
122 Jane Elsmere, The Notorious Yazoo Land Fraud Case, 51 GA. HIST. Q. 425, 426 (1967). 
123 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810). 
124 Id. (noting U.S. Const. art. 1 §10 cl. 1, “no state shall …pass any … law impairing the obligation of 
contracts.”). 
125 Id. at 132. 
126 Id. at 134. 
127 Id. at 138.  




Native land through a series of land lotteries beginning in 1805.129 The so-called Cherokee 
land lotteries accelerated with two more lotteries in 1832 and another in 1833, and yet the 
Cherokees refused to move.130 These lotteries ultimately sold off three-quarters of Georgia 
to 100,000 white settlers at deeply depreciated prices.131 Ross complained directly to 
President Jackson that the lotteries had been enforced by “[a]rmed bands . . . parading thro’ 
their country.”132 
In 1828, Georgia declared its intention to take control of all Cherokee land.133 
Georgia nullified the Cherokee Constitution, forbade the Cherokee Council to assemble, 
and prohibited Cherokees from mining gold on their own territory.134 Vigilantes and land 
speculators commonly coerced, defrauded, bribed or bartered titles out of the hands of 
individual Cherokees. These conveyances turned the Cherokee Nation into a checkerboard 
of holdings while simultaneously constricting the efficiency of Cherokee rulemaking and 
the sense of personal security over remaining Cherokee homesteads.135 Following the New 
Echota Treaty, the Georgia militia forced some Cherokees to pay back rent for squatting 
on farms that they used to own.136 
Ironically, Ridge had earlier “pushed a law through the Cherokee Council setting 
death as the penalty for selling tribal lands.”137 This act may have unwittingly created for 
Ridge the legal instrument that signed his own death warrant. Although intended to stop 
the piecemeal loss of Cherokee territory by applying the death penalty to private 
 
129 See Jim Gigantino, Land Lottery System, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 17, 2006), 
https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/land-lottery-system 
[https://perma.cc/8HX7-R5LH] (noting other such lottery sales in 1807, 1820, 1821, and 1827). 
130 As a collective, the Seminoles also resisted removal from the southeast for the longest period, and many 
individual Natives fled into the southeastern hills rather than remove. For recordings by Native authors who 
identify with ancestors who refused to remove, see generally THE PEOPLE WHO STAYED: SOUTHEASTERN 
INDIAN WRITING AFTER REMOVAL (Geary Hobson et al. eds., 2010) (including, inter alia, perspectives 
from Natives of the Pamunkey, Lumbee, Catawba, and Chickasaw Tribes). For Tribe-specific studies of the 
politics and pressures of removal, see generally MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE POLITICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL: 
CREEK GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN CRISIS (1985); ARTHUR H. DEROSIER JR., THE REMOVAL OF THE 
CHOCTAW INDIANS (1970); Linda Hogan, Response: New Trees, New Medicines, New Wars: The 
Chickasaw Removal, 42 CAN. REV. COMP. LITERATURE 121 (2015); JAMES W. COVINGTON, THE 
SEMINOLES OF FLORIDA (1993). 
131 See Gigantino, supra note 129. 
132  Letter from J. Ross et al. to Andrew Jackson, LIBR. CONG., (Jan. 23, 1835), 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/maj.01089_0067_0069/?sp=1&st=text [https://perma.cc/TH8H-RM7N]. 
133 See generally BRIAN HICKS, TOWARD THE SETTING SUN: JOHN ROSS, THE CHEROKEES, AND THE TRAIL 
OF TEARS (2011). 
134 See Gary C. Anders, The Reduction of a Self-Sufficient People to Poverty and Welfare Dependence: An 
Analysis of the Causes of Cherokee Indian Underdevelopment, 40 AM J. ECON. & SOC. 225, 228 (1981). 
135 See Meraji, supra note 81 (recording comments by historian Julie Reed). 
136 See Robin Patric Clair, Organizing Silence: Silence as Voice and Voice as Silence in the Narrative 
Exploration of the Treaty of New Echota, 61 W. J. COMM. 315, 321 (1997) (quoting an 1836 letter of 
complaint from Ridge to Andrew Jackson). 
137 The Life of Major Ridge, supra note 45. Ridge more than legislatively argued for the death penalty. He 
helped to kill Cherokee Chief Doublehead for profiteering through the sale of tribal hunting grounds, and 
he led the objection to U.S. Indian agents’ coaxing of Principal Chief Black Fox’s proposal to move west in 
1808. See Hicks, supra note 45.  
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transactions, Ridge later inverted that practice with the Treaty of New Echota, which 
perfected the wholesale loss of tribal land through international agreement. The former law 
embraced Cherokee legislative process, while the latter treaty circumvented the same. 
However, both the Cherokee domestic penalty of death and the international treaty shared 
a common point. The instruments indicated the growing intramural factionalism that had 
come to split the Nation. This factionalism would further penetrate and ultimately fracture 
the national identity politics of the tribe during its removal to land reserved for it in 
Oklahoma, which had already been populated by Western Nation Cherokees in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century.  
 
VIII. APPEASEMENT STRATEGY 
 
As had been the case with the Shawnees in their fateful alliance with Britain, the 
Cherokee Nation’s identity was informed by interactions with the whites. Ridge served 
under Jackson at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend (1814), which destroyed the Creeks’ 
military might and their calculated alliance with the British.138 Horseshoe Bend convinced 
important other southeastern Natives peoples, particularly the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and 
Choctaws, of the need to adopt a strategy of appeasement with the whites, realizing they 
could not defeat them in war.139 As one of the largest and wealthiest tribes, the Cherokees 
applied these strengths toward the creation of a proto-Indian state within the United States: 
they alphabetized their language (with Sequoyah’s 1825 creation of a syllabary), achieved 
mass literacy, adopted a written constitution in 1827, assimilated and acculturated as 
Christians with the translation of the Bible into Cherokee, published a national bilingual 
newspaper called the Cherokee Phoenix, and modeled legislative, judicial, and educational 
practices on the American republic through support of separation of powers, bicameral 
legislative structure, and church mission schools.140 They also adopted agricultural 
technologies and sartorial styles of the white settlers.141 The agricultural improvements bid 
up the cost of removal efforts and created the perception among Georgians that the 
 
138 See Alice Taylor-Colbert, Major Ridge (ca. 1771-1839), NEW GA. ENCYCL. 
https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/major-ridge-ca-1771-1839 
[https://perma.cc/DB27-HGYZ].  
139 The principal exception was the Seminole people of Florida, who resisted in federal incursions to 
retrieve runaway slaves (1817-1818, the First Seminole War), the Second Seminal War (1835-1842), and 
the Third Seminole War (1855-1858); See generally JOHN MISSALL & MARY LOU MISSAL, THE SEMINOLE 
WARS: AMERICA’S LONGEST INDIAN CONFLICT (2004). 
140 Sequoyah’s syllabary began with 115-200 symbols, reduced to 86 symbols when published, after which 
the last symbol was dropped, making for 85 symbols. See APRIL R. SUMMITT, SEQUOYAH AND THE 
INVENTION OF THE CHEROKEE ALPHABET 61 (2012).  The Cherokees achieved almost universal literacy, 
surpassing Southern white command of written English and contributing to the intellectual and diplomatic 
skills of the Nation. See generally JAMES W. PARINS, LITERACY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN THE CHEROKEE 
NATION 1820-1906 (2013).  
141 See William G. McLoughlin, Thomas Jefferson and the Beginning of Cherokee Nationalism, 1806 to 
1809, 32 WM. & MARY Q. 547, 547 (1975). On the sartorial styles, see Young, The Cherokee Nation, supra 
note 84, at 516 (discussing adoption of frock coats, pantaloons, stiff collars, and top hats). 
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Cherokee leadership had evolved into a “bourgeois planter aristocracy, much like the 
Georgians’.”142 For their efforts they achieved recognition as one of the Five Civilized 
Tribes of the American southeast,143 an appellation that ultimately failed to satiate United 
States land hunger and expansion designs toward the Mississippi River. 
 
IX. WHAT ABOUT WORCESTER? 
 
Other problematic clashes between federal and state authority loomed large. In 
1830, Georgia extended jurisdiction over previously exempted Cherokee Territory144 and 
executed a Cherokee national named Corn Tassel who had been accused of murdering 
another Cherokee in Cherokee Territory.145 Corn Tassel argued that he could only be tried 
in the courts of his nation, and not by the courts of the State of Georgia.146 The Supreme 
Court granted his writ in error and issued a citation to Georgia to show cause for 
proceeding, but the court never heard this element of the case.147 Georgia’s governor 
referred the writ to the legislature, which resolved to “disregard every and any mandate 
and process that should be served upon them,”148 a clear challenge to the meaning of the 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.149 Accordingly, Georgia refused to recognize the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, refused to send legal counsel to argue its case before the 
Court, and executed Corn Tassels immediately, thus mooting out the writ of error 
question.150 
Sensitive to the pro-removal sentiment of Congress, which had recently enacted the 
Indian Removal Act, aware of the futility of seeking redress in hostile Georgia state courts, 
and concerned about delay via an action launched in federal district court, the Cherokee 
Nation then devised a plan to vindicate its sovereign rights through a direct appeal to the 
 
142 Young, Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia, supra note 114, at 49.  
143 For historical background, see generally GRANT FOREMAN, THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES: CHEROKEE, 
CHICKASAW, CHOCTAW, CREEK, SEMINOLE (1934). The usage of the term “civilized” meant to differentiate 
these tribes from other tribes, described as “merciless Indian Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare, is an 
undistinguished Destruction, of all Ages, Sexes and Conditions.”; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE  
(US 1776) (“He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the 
inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an 
undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.”). 
144 See Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, U.S.-Cherokee, 7 Stat. 18 (detailing agreed upon boundary 
divisions between the Cherokees and the United States). 
145 The State v. George Tassels, 1 Ga. Rep. Ann. 478, 1 Dud. 229 (1830). See generally Robert S. Davis, 




148 Swindler, infra note 191, at 9 (quoting the Georgia resolution). 
149 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
150 See Georgia, the Cherokee, and the Execution of Corn Tassel, NATIVEAMERICANNETROOTS (Dec. 14, 
2015), http://nativeamericannetroots.net/diary/2033 [https://perma.cc/3JW2-F2E3]. 
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Supreme Court. It employed a provision of the Constitution that granted the Court “original 
jurisdiction” to hear cases between a state and a foreign nation.151  
The case Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia (1831) sought to enjoin Georgia 
from enforcing its laws that after 1828 sought to restrict Cherokee sovereign authority.152 
The argument before the Court turned on the basis of the supremacy of treaty law between 
the United States and Indian nations as opposed to the state law issued by Georgia to 
regulate Indian relations. Chief Justice Marshall noted that the Cherokee Nation consisted 
of a state with an independent people, however, he hedged on the question of whether it 
was a foreign state, owing to “peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere 
else.”153 Significantly, Marshall drew attention in the Constitution to the term “foreign 
nations,” which in his view did not include Native Tribes in relation to treaties because 
another section of the Constitution regulated commerce with foreign nations “and with the 
Indian tribes.”154 He concluded that the Cherokees were not a foreign nation within the 
meaning of the Constitution.155 He reasoned: “if the Indian tribes are foreign nations, they 
would have been included without being specifically named, and being so named imports 
something different from the previous term ‘foreign nations’.”156 ‘Something different’ 
meant that the Cherokees (and each individual tribe) were a “domestic dependent 
nation.”157 Marshall reasoned that:  
 
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, 
which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession 
ceases; meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage. Their relations to the 
United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian.158  
 
Because the judicial power to hear original jurisdiction cases only extended to cases 
between a state and a foreign nation, Marshall ruled that the Court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the Cherokees’ claims, and the case was dismissed.159 
Soon thereafter, a more direct opportunity to secure the jurisdiction of the Court 
arose, resulting in a clear-cut, 5-1 majority decision supporting Native sovereignty rights. 
And yet even this case, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), again written by Marshall, could not 
forestall the removal campaign.160 
 
151  U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1 (conferring jurisdiction in controversies “between a state, or the citizens 
thereof, and foreign states”). 
152 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
153 Id. at 16. 
154 Id. at 62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power to . . . regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”). Id. at 62.  
155 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. 
156 Id. at 62. 
157 Id. at 17. 
158 Id. 
159 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 39. 
160 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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The case came before the Court due to Georgia’s imprisonment of two white 
missionaries for living in Cherokee Territory and refusing to obtain a state license to live 
there.161 One of the missionaries, Worcester, also served in a federal capacity as the 
postmaster of the Cherokee capital city of New Echota.162 His federal status brought 
directly into conflict the applicability of Georgia state law.163 The judgment asserted the 
sovereignty of Native American nations as separate from the United States and “completely 
separated from that of the states,”164 and the court held that the Cherokee Nation consisted 
of “a distinct community occupying its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can 
have no force.”165 This victory for the Cherokees included judicial recognition that the 
Constitution vested authority in the United States government to regulate relations with 
Natives and that “the treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory 
as completely separated from that of the states.”166 
Perhaps most important, Marshall nuanced and reformulated the discovery doctrine 
principle that he articulated nine years earlier in Johnson v. M’Intosh.167 There, the Court 
bestowed sovereignty (meaning the underlying fee title to the land of the New World) on 
the European discoverers and conquerors of the New World using language that naturally 
assumed the rational connection between Enlightenment values, Christianity, and 
civilization.168 M’Intosh introduced the proposition that the proper chain of title over the 
land occupied by Natives had to trace from this immanent principle of dominium embedded 
in and created by the western legal mindset. Native peoples implicitly lost whatever powers 
of external sovereignty they ever possessed by virtue of their incorporation into the United 
States.169 
 
161 Id. at 529. 
162 See Tim Alan Garrison, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2004), 
https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/worcester-v-georgia-1832 
[https://perma.cc/7EJV-69V3].  
163 See id.  
164  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519. 
165 Id. at 561; see also id. at 520 (“[A]nd which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the 
assent of the Cherokees themselves.”). 
166 Id. at 557 (holding as well that Indian Tribes were “distinct political communities, having territorial 
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive . . . which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed 
by the United States”).  
167 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (establishing territorial possession according 
to the discovery principle). 
168Id. at 570 (citing to Locke, Grotius, Vattel, and Montesquieu, Marshall wrote: “All the proprietary rights 
of civilized nations on this continent are founded on this [discovery] principle. The right derived from 
discovery and conquest, can rest on no other basis; and all existing titles depend on the fundamental title of 
the crown by discovery.”). See also id. at 576–77 (“[A]sserting a right to take possession, notwithstanding 
the occupancy of the natives, who were heathens, and, at the same time, admitting the prior title of any 
Christian people who may have made a previous discovery.”). 
169 FELIX COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 244 (1982). The discovery doctrine 
powerfully influenced the idea that settler nations own the underlying title to tribal land basis and was 
exported to English-speaking nations around the world, forming the basis for the Aboriginal Property 




In the early nineteenth century maturation process of the Supreme Court, and with 
regard to the Court’s role as a balancer of interests between competing congressional and 
executive functions, the developing republican legal order adopted an internalist dimension 
that sustained the rule of law through the judiciary’s own self-formed means of applying 
core principles to ever-changing factual circumstances. The self-contained recourse to 
these principles reflected the doctrine of immanence, which later in the century contributed 
to the fuller expression of legal formalism.170 Legal formalism was a method that asserted 
that mature, introspective, judicial analysis of legal principles could produce the one and 
only solution to a case. Judges needed no supplements outside of the law itself to administer 
justice. If the roots of formalism emphasized the role of the judge to find the applicable 
legal principle to solve a dispute, they also embedded an often unexamined and pre-formed 
importation of assumptions—actually not immanent to aboriginal Native experience at 
all—which inexorably drew from the deep cisterns of the European jus publicum and 
Christian Europe. The dogmatic assertion of the discovery doctrine, based on conquest and 
Christian entitlement, created the unexamined proposition that the right of soil belonged to 
the proper inheritors of New World title, the Christian Europeans themselves. 
However, in Worcester, Marshall massaged his previous meaning of the discovery 
doctrine by nuancing the idea that Native Americans “retained considerable inherent 
sovereignty.”171 He adjusted his rationale because southern states, principally Georgia, had 
aggressively constructed their own possessory colonial charter claims granted by the 
original suzerain, the crown of England.172 Georgia based its claim on the M’Intosh ruling 
and the descent of the chain of title conveyed by the crown charter. Georgia also had been 
emboldened by the Supreme Court ruling in Harcourt v. Gaillard (1827), which affirmed 
“[t]here was no territory within the United States that was claimed in any other right than 
that of some one of the confederated states; therefore, there could be no acquisition of 
territory made by the United States distinct from, or independent of some one of the 
 
Nations’ Land rights in Canada and possibly elsewhere. See also Lindsay Robertson, Cherokee Cases 
(1/3): Johnson v. M’Intosh, YOUTUBE, at 17:32 (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9etyRazLvk. 
170 The doctrine of immanence suggests that “the rationality of law lies in a moral order immanent to legal 
material.” Earnest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 
955 (1988). This idea projects the belief that law presents “a self-contained internalist dimension—a 
provenance of plenitude or immanent moral rationality” where legal reasoning looks within the body of 
law, not outside of law, to ascertain the correct rule application. See Christopher R. Rossi, The Widening 
Gyre: Legal Formalism and International Law’s Sense of Place, 11 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 
116 (2021). 
171 William Walters, Review Essay: Preemption, Tribal Sovereignty, and Worcester v. Georgia, 62 OR. L. 
REV. 127, 131 (1983). 
172 In M’Intosh, Marshall wrote: “The title of the crown (as representing the nation) passed to the colonists 
by charters, which were absolute grants of the soil; and it was a first principle in colonial law, that all titles 
must be derived from the crown.” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 570. Earlier in the opinion, 
Marshall indeed recognized that sovereignty had been “held, occupied, and possessed, in full sovereignty, 
by various independent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns of their respective portions of 
the territory, and the absolute owners and proprietors of the soil.” Id. at 545. However, these rights were 
lost due to application of the discovery doctrine and its corollaries pertaining to purchase or conquest.  
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states.”173 As the self-proclaimed successor of interest and as the landlord of territory 
chartered to it,174 the Georgia General Assembly began enacting laws in 1828-1829 with 
the intent of administratively absorbing Cherokee Country into four nine-square-mile 
districts and subdivided land lots.175 Georgia’s legislative action did not depend on whether 
the Cherokees removed from Georgia.176 Acting essentially as a leaseholder, Georgia 
intended to change the terms of Cherokee tenancy by declaring that all Indian customs and 
laws would be null and void after June 1, 1830.177 
Marshall may have sensed that his core discovery doctrine principle had taken on 
an unanticipated life of its own.178 He may have recognized that the aggressive assertation 
of states’ rights could jeopardize a delicate, judicially-informed federation model that had 
established the courts as the branch competent to pass judgment on the meaning of the 
Constitution. The rising tension between the federal government and states as to where 
originary title properly vested required judicial re-visitation.179 The significant yet oblique 
outcome of the Cherokee Trilogy cases is that Native American rights were often subsumed 
by discussions about competing federal-state rights to the soil, leading to an abridgement 
of discussions about aboriginal title.180  
In Worcester, Marshall elaborated on language employed in M’Intosh in order to 
curtail Georgia’s bold assertions of state power. However, in crafting the Worcester 
opinion, Marshall artfully avoided any mention of amending M’Intosh, possibly to avoid 
undermining the nascent legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s self-designated competency to 
serve as final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution.181 In Worcester, Marshall may 
have crafted a cupboard into which over-extended invocations of the discovery doctrine 
could be stored. 
 
173 Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 526 (1827). 
174 See Young, Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia, supra note 114, at 61-62 (noting “[u]nder the inherent 
sovereign rights of the state, devolved from the British Crown, Georgians were the proprietors of Georgia. 
Indians were, at best, tenants-at-will, and at Georgia’s will they must seek another landlord.”). 
175 Young, Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia, supra note 114, at 43, 50. 
176 Young, supra note 114, at 50; Cherokee County, HIST. ATLAS GA. COUNTIES, 
https://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/histcountymaps/cherokeehistmaps.htm [https://perma.cc/PH3S-D447].  
177 See LAWS OF THE COLONIAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS, RELATING TO INDIANS AND INDIAN AFFAIRS 
199 (1979); Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 500, 503 (1969) (noting laws precluding the rights of Natives to testify in cases involving whites). 
178 See generally LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005) (discussing the political means by which 
Marshall’s discovery doctrine circumvented Native occupancy in western stretches of Virginia and what 
would become Kentucky to uphold bartered land concessions to Revolutionary War soldiers as payment for 
service).   
179 Marshall wrote in Worcester: “The ambiguous phrases which follow the grant of power to the United 
States, were so construed by the states of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the power itself.”. 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
180 The Worcester decision has been read to uphold the proposition that federal authority over Indian affairs 
preempts the exercise of state authority, however arguments arise over whether the Constitution actually 
precludes state action over Indian affairs. See Walters, supra note 171, at 133, 135.  
181 The question of the compétence de la compétence to interpret the meaning of the Constitution had been 
decided by Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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Marshall reasoned in Worcester that the conveyance of title to land in the New 
World contradicted the “extravagant and absurd idea” that the colonial “settlements made 
on the sea coast” provided the license “to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea 
to sea.”182 Such a thought: 
  
[D]id not enter the mind of any man. [The land grants] were well understood 
to convey the title which, according to the common law of European 
sovereigns respecting America, they might rightfully convey, and no more. 
This was the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were 
willing to sell. The crown could not be understood to grant what the crown 
did not affect to claim; nor was it so understood.183  
 
Marshall construed the charter claims as “incompatible with the lofty ideas of granting the 
soil, and all its inhabitants from sea to sea [to the new colonies] . . . . [T]hese grants asserted 
a title against Europeans only, and were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of 
the natives were concerned.”184 Elsewhere, Marshall wrote:  
 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent 
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single 
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from 
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of 
the coast of the particular region claimed.185 
 
Of this decision, which condemned the “extraterritorial” reach of Georgia’s 
legislature over Cherokee Territory,186 Jackson purportedly said, “John Marshall has made 
his decision, now let him enforce it.”187 Stylizing the Supreme Court as a foreign court with 
no right to enforce its judgment at the state level, Georgia’s governor refused to release the 
 
182 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 517.  
183 Id. at 545. 
184 Id. at 546. 
185 Id. at 559. 
186 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542; Id. at 516 (noting “the extraterritorial power of every legislature 
being limited in its action to its own citizens or subjects, the very passage of this act is an assertion of 
jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation.”). See Walters, supra note 171, at 132 (noting that the usage of the 
word “extraterritorial” implies that “Georgia could not legislate within Cherokee territory because the 
Cherokees constitute a separate sovereign so that Georgia's action would be extraterritorial and therefore 
impotent.” This interpretation would indicate Marshall rejected the federal preemption doctrine because the 
state lacked coexistent jurisdictional authority in the first place.).  
187 Historians dispute that Jackson actually made this claim, although if he did not say it, he probably would 
have thought it. See BAKER, supra note 69, at 745. Shortly after the decision, Jackson wrote: “The decision 
of the Supreme Court has fell still born, and they find they cannot coerce Georgia to yield its mandate.” 4 
CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON, 1829-32, at 430 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1929) (noting as well 
that the Cherokees were not strong enough to avoid destruction through resistance). 
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imprisoned missionaries from hard labor.188 The Jackson administration also sent 
emissaries to tribes to inform them that the decision was incorrect, persuading the 
Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Muscogee Creek to prepare to remove.189 Georgia and the 
Jackson administration’s contemptuous refusal to recognize or enforce the Court’s 
judgment quickly took on the ominous tone of a major constitutional crisis. However, 
shortly thereafter, an even more imposing federal state crisis arose.  
Southern discontent with a series of post-1815 protective tariffs, including the so-
called 1828 Tariff of Abominations and the insufficient tariff reduction act of 1832, 
prompted the South Carolina legislature to nullify the perceived pro-Northern federal 
legislation and defy the collection of duties, bringing the nation to the “verge of Civil 
War.”190 In an unscripted but obvious way, South Carolina invoked the condominium 
understanding between Georgia and the Jackson administration over non-enforcement of 
federal authority in Cherokee Territory and applied this rationale much more broadly to a 
state’s non-enforcement of federal revenue collection and tariff policy. Turning a blind eye 
toward state actions that threatened the federal treasury proved much more dangerous for 
the Jackson administration than the blind eye it had turned toward a state’s administrative 
dealings with Natives within its own borders. Jackson committed full attention to the 
nullification crisis after pressuring the Georgia governor to pardon Worcester and his 
fellow missionary.191 
Described as one of Marshall’s “most courageous and eloquent opinions,”192 and 
“foundational” in terms of modern federal Indian law,193 the Worcester opinion precluded 
state interference in internal tribal affairs without Congressional authorization. The case 
also recognized that “tribes retained considerable inherent sovereignty” unless Congress 
explicitly limited those rights.194 However, the reformulation of the discovery doctrine in 
Worcester, which rejected the “extravagant and absurd” idea that states could extend the 
license derived from colonial settlements to govern the peoples and lands from sea to sea, 
 
188 See Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 
39 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 519 (1973) (noting that the two Congregationalist missionaries “remained in the 
Milledgeville penitentiary until ten months after the decision.”).  
189 See Lindsay Robertson, Cherokee Cases (3/3): Worcester v. Georgia, YOUTUBE, at 19:31 (Nov. 7, 
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzBVC2sTZ_U.  
190 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 1816-1836, at ix (1966). 
191 Jackson postured to resolve the Worcester stalemate in Georgia by negotiating a pardon for Worcester 
(and co-defendant Butler) in order to concentrate attention on the South Carolina crisis. See generally 
William F. Swindler, Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 7 (1975) (noting 
Georgia’s and the Jackson administration’s attempts to ignore the judgment but mentioning the South 
Carolina nullification crisis, which later led to the release of the missionaries). Displeased with Jackson’s 
tactics, the Governor delayed the pardon until the last day before the Supreme Court reconvened for its next 
term. See Robertson, Cherokee Cases: Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 169, at 18:58. See generally also 
Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. 
S. HIST. 519 (1973) (noting they remained incarcerated until ten months after the decision). 
192 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959). 
193 Walters, supra note 171.  
194 Id. at 131. 
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never fully developed due to compositional changes to the Supreme Court beginning in its 
1836 term. With Jackson appointees in control, the Court found five occasions in the next 
eight years to reinsert the Johnson v. M’Intosh standard that Europeans acquired the 




The United States Supreme Court recognized in 2020 that a fraudulent promise 
awaited Natives “on the far end of the Trail of Tears . . . .  Forced to leave their ancestral 
lands in Georgia and Alabama, [they] received assurances that their new lands in the West 
would be secure forever.”196 Recognizing a “sadly familiar pattern,” the Court lamented 
that the promise often had been broken.197 When the “price of keeping [promises became] 
too great, . . . [the United States] just cast a blind eye.”198  
Casting new light on the blind eye, the Court ruled in McGirt v. Oklahoma that 
about 19 million acres of land throughout much of eastern Oklahoma that had been 
reserved for the Creek Nation since the nineteenth century remained a Native American 
Territory.199 By subjecting the blind eye to the scrutiny of the roman law principle of ex 
injuria jus non oritur (legal rights cannot arise from wrongdoing)200 the Court wrote: 
“Unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to 
amend the law.”201 Legal scholars immediately hailed the decision as “a stunning 
reaffirmance of the nation’s obligations to Native Americans.”202  
  Another forgotten promise also stood at the beginning of the Trail of Tears, a 
promise of reciprocated good faith between the negotiating parties. The deal inducing the 
removal of Cherokees to the Oklahoma Territory more than turned a blind eye to the 
promise of federal representation in the United States House of Representatives, which 
 
195 Robertson, Cherokee Cases: Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 169, at 21:47. 
196 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020) (noting that the promise in this case specifically 
applied to the Creek Nation). 
197 Id. at 2482. 
198 Id. 
199 The doctrine of recognition, although political in nature and often arising in violent confrontations of 
cession or annexation did not admit of the unrestricted pretense of negotiating with persons considered to 
lack standing to represent the government. Such a practice cannot be ignored, however. The 2014 Russian 
annexation of Crimea was based on a fraudulent referendum.  
200 See generally, Christopher R. Rossi, “Ex Injuria Jus Non Oritur, Ex Factis Jus Oritur and the Elusive 
Search for Equilibrium after Ukraine,” 24 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143-73 (2015). 
201 McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2482. 
202 Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Toe Hard Line in Affirming Reservation Status for Eastern 
Oklahoma, SCOTUSBLOG (July 9, 2020, 7:15 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/opinion-analysis-
justices-toe-hard-line-in-affirming-reservation-status-for-eastern-oklahoma/ [https://perma.cc/9Y7W-
WQJF]; Dahlia Lithwick, What’s Behind Neil Gorsuch’s Stunning Win for Indigenous People, SLATE (July 
13, 2020, 3:34 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/07/mcgirt-v-oklahoma-neil-gorsuch-tribal-
rights.html [https://perma.cc/DP9B-EZKK] (discussing the opinion with Erwin Chemerinsky, who noted 
the decision’s “enormous implications”). 
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remains a contested issue to this day.203 It also ignobly validated the exodus of Natives 
from their ancestral nomos by turning a blind eye to a fraudulent treaty itself. If the blind 
eye is a metaphor for valuing political expediency over the rule of law, one cannot help but 
wonder how the atoning McGirt dictum impacts Marshall’s important expression of the 
discovery doctrine in Johnson v. M’Intosh, which undergirded the fraudulent conveyance 
of Native land through the politically expedient expression of immanent values of Christian 
identity, European civilization, jus soli, and Enlightenment notions of land cultivation.  
Perhaps the Jackson administration could have parried criticism by noting that the 
legal personality of the Cherokee Nation depended on the Jackson administration’s 
political decision to deal with the Ridge faction rather than the Ross faction—an adaptation 
of the emerging doctrine of state recognition (known as the constitutive theory) that 
conveys the legal personality of statehood on the purely internal political decision of other 
states.204 However, the requirements of state recognition could only imperfectly apply. The 
Jackson administration had already abjured the notion that a Cherokee State existed within 
the United States due to its two-fold reliance on the discovery doctrine as articulated in 
M’Intosh, and the “domestic dependent” status of the Nation expressed in Cherokee Nation 
v. The State of Georgia. Furthermore, it would be anachronistic to apply the competing 
theory of state recognition—the declaratory theory— to the situation at hand as this theory 
arose in the 1933 Montevideo Convention and had not congealed in the nineteenth century 
(despite a prolonged historical evolution).205 However, one of its four provisos required “a 
capacity to enter into relations with other states,”206 which the Ridge faction did not 
possess. The Jackson administration tacitly recognized Ridge’s lack of capacity to 
represent the Tribe as it had already entered into negotiations with the Ross faction in 
January 1835. Ross told Jackson the Cherokees would remove for a $20 million fee.207 
Jackson deemed the amount outrageous.208 Ross probably proposed the sum knowing it 
was a non-starter but thinking to buy time.209 Here, he may have made his “biggest 
mistake”210 when he petitioned to allow the Senate to “grant us as liberal terms as the 
Senate . . . would be willing to allow.”211 The Senate responded with an offer of only $5 
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million and Ross’ rejection of the offer exposed his official delegation to charges of 
stalling.212 To the shock of the Cherokee Nation, the Jackson administration rejected 
further dealings with its Principal Chief, forced a fraudulent deal on the unofficial Treaty 
Party, and then used the Treaty of New Echota to pay off political debts owed to states 
restless with unmet charter-cession claims, anxious for cotton acreage, and suspicious of 
federal overreach with fiscal and trade policy.213 
These values vested the right of the soil in the beneficiaries of a metropolitan chain 
of title, which declined unassumingly to the American-born progeny of the European 
Enlightenment. The abridgment of Native interests privileged the European right of soil 
over indigenous perspectives, and masked irregularities involved in the treaty negotiation 
process because Cherokee resistance to the treaty was construed as an improper assertion 
of title involving chartered territory to which Natives could only present a derivative claim. 
This claim was never based on land improvement, or original fee title, but rather on the 
assignment of a Native tenancy or occupancy designation provided at the ‘sufferance’ of 
the true landlords, who became increasingly frustrated by the obdurate Native refusal to 
remove. 
Although revisited by Marshall in the Worcester judgment and forestalled in terms 
of more textured explication due to the influx of Jackson-appointed Justices to the Court, 
the discovery doctrine language of Johnson v. M’Intosh can be reduced, in essence, to the 
following:  
 
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an 
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been 
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been 
acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the 
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be 
questioned.214 
 
As powerful as the ex injuria principle is in relation to historically unkept and now partially 
remediated promises at the far end of the Trail of Tears, it remains offset by an equally 
powerful roman law principle that is embedded in the discovery doctrine—ex factis jus 
oritur (law arises from the facts).215 The discovery doctrine was recognized by Marshall as 
“the extravagant pretension” that cannot now be questioned. It is as if he were intimating 
that one should let bygones be bygones. Such forgiveness was questioned by Justice 
Gorsuch’s opinion in McGirt. He noted that unlawful acts remain unlawful despite their 
factual reality and the sufficient vigor by which they are performed.216 It is as if he were 
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Carolina to slowly lower tariffs over a ten-year period in exchange for an end to the nullification crisis).  
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intimating that remediation for injustice bears no date of expiration. What form a full 
remedy may take remains a sublime question. Any complete answer will necessarily 
encounter the memory of New Echota, the mausoleum ghost capital of the Cherokee Nation 
located at the first step of the Trail of Tears.  
